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All Relationships Dissipate Except This:  
The Attitude-Behavior Link on the Roberts Court 
Jeffrey A. Segal 
ABSTRACT 
In contrast to two prominent themes in behavioral research—that 
major findings often cannot be replicated, and that there is a very 
weak relationship between attitudes and behavior—this Article shows 
that the observed relationship between the ideology of Supreme 
Court Justices, as measured by newspaper editorials in prominent 
papers between the nomination by the President and their 
confirmation by the Senate, and their voting behavior once on the 
Supreme Court, as first reported by Segal and Cover, has 
strengthened from the Burger Court to the Roberts Court.  The 
Article identifies several explanations consistent with this trend. 
ALL RELATIONSHIPS DISSIPATE, EXCEPT THIS 
A prominent theme in psychology over the past few years is that 
key findings cannot be replicated, or a little less severely, that 
relationships dissipate.  A recent review in Science found that efforts 
to replicate twenty-seven “well-known” studies resulted in “complete 
failure” in more than one-third of the attempts.1  In another set of 
 
 1 John Bohannon, Replication Effort Provokes Praise—and ‘Bullying’ 
Charges, 344 SCIENCE 788–89 (2014). See also Richard A. Klein et al., 
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replication studies, the original findings were not as strong as the 
original results, in other words, the relationships dissipated.2 
These findings are not limited to psychology: Schoenfeld and 
Ioannidis gathered fifty common ingredients from random cookbook 
recipes in The Boston Cooking-School Cook Book.3  For those 
ingredients with more than ten published studies assessing the 
relative risks of cancer from the ingredients, most had studies 
showing both increased and decreased risks.4 A popular discussion of 
their findings in Vox sardonically claims “everything we eat both 
causes and prevents cancer.”5 The exceptions were bacon, pork, salt 
 
Investigating Variation in Replicability, 45 SOC. PYSCHOL. 142 (2014); Jens 
P. Asendorpf et al., Recommendations for Increasing Replicability in 
Psychology, 27 EUR. J. OF PERSONALITY 108 (2013); Harold Pashler & 
Christine R. Harris, Is the Replicability Crisis Overblown? Three Arguments 
Examined, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 531 (2012); David C. Funder 
et al., Improving the Dependability of Research in Personality and Social 
Psychology Recommendations for Research and Educational Practice, 18 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 3 (2013); Daniel T. Gilbert et al., 
Comment, Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science, 351 
SCIENCE 1037-a (2016) (arguing that the replication efforts were not precise 
enough to offer firm conclusions as to replicability); Christopher J. 
Anderson et al., Response, Comment on “Estimating the Reproducibility of 
Psychological Science,” 351 SCIENCE 1037 (2016) (a reply to the Gilbert 
critique); Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Response, Reply to Our Technical 
Comment on “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science,” 
GARY KING (Apr. 7, 2016), https://gking.harvard.edu/publications/comment-
estimating-reproducibility-psychological-science (response to the Anderson 
critique of Gilbert). 
 2 Bohannon, supra note 1, at 789. 
 3 Jonathan D. Schoenfeld & John P.A. Ioannidis, Is Everything We Eat 
Associated with Cancer? A Systematic Cookbook Review, 97 AM. J. 
CLINICAL NUTRITION 127 (2012). 
 4 Id. at 130. 
 5 Julia Belluz, This is Why You Shouldn’t Believe that Exciting New 
Medical Study, VOX (Feb. 27, 2017), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/3/23/8264355/research-study-hype. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/18
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(every study showed an increased risk), and olives (every study 
showed a decreased risk). But for studies of wine (six decreased, 
three increased), coffee (four, and four), eggs (four, and six), and 
thirteen other ingredients, they found both positive and negative 
effects.6 
The reasons for failures to replicate are plentiful. First, there is the 
famous “file drawer” problem.7 Given the nature of classical 
hypothesis testing, journals are more likely to publish findings that 
reject the null hypothesis than findings that fail to. This leads scholars 
whose work fails to reject their null hypothesis to place those 
manuscripts in their file drawer, rather than submit them for 
publication. Consider two variables that are not related to one 
another.  Most studies examining such a relationship will fail to reject 
the null and thus probably won’t see any more light of day than that 
provided at disciplinary conferences. Five percent of the studies, 
though, will be significant at the 0.05 level. Under such 
circumstances, journals “will publish only the papers that come to the 
wrong conclusions, and our file drawers will be filled with all the 
papers that come to the right conclusions!”8 
A second explanation is that social and behavioral research may 
be time bound. Ulmer noted that background variables vary over time 
in the extent that that were able to predict the votes of Supreme Court 
Justices.9 Support for treating everyone equally regardless of race 
was once the position of liberals in the United States,10 though 
support for race-conscious admissions and hiring is now more 
 
 6 Schenfeld & Ioannisdis, supra note 3, at 130. 
 7 GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY 105 (1994); Satish 
Iyengar & Joel B. Greenhouse, Selection Models and the File Drawer 
Problem, 3 STAT. SCI. 109, 110 (1988). 
 8 KING ET AL., supra note 7, at 105 
 9 Sidney S. Ulmer, Are Social Background Models Time-Bound?, 80 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 957 (1986). 
 10 DAVID ROHDE & HAROLD SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION 
MAKING (1976) (see generally chapter 7). 
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strongly supported by liberals.11 Similarly, support for free speech 
rights is something that liberals on the Supreme Court once favored 
more strongly than did conservatives.12 That relationship is no longer 
the case.13  Changes in institutions certainly influence behavior. 14  
Examples of changed institutions include the Senate’s change in 
cloture rules, the Supreme Court’s reapportionment decisions or the 
establishment of the Supreme Court’s Rule of Four, which provides 
the mechanism for the Court to grant petitions for writs of certiorari, 
could readily lead to time bound behavioral results.  
Third, some scientists narrow their hypotheses until they find a 
positive result, what is referred to as the “garden of forking paths.”15 
Simply put, most hypotheses have dozens if not hundreds of ways in 
which they could be tested. Researchers have choices as to how to 
measure the dependent and independent variables, which data to 
include, which control variables to include, and which interactions to 
examine. If each of those options has five alternatives there are 55 = 
3125 options. This is among the reasons that it is always acceptable 
to broaden your hypothesis in response to patterns found in data, but 
if you wish to narrow your hypothesis in response to patterns found 
in data, you must retest the hypothesis with independent data.16  
 
 11 LAWRENCE BAUM, IDEOLOGY IN THE SUPREME COURT 166 (2017). 
 12 ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 10. 
 13 Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the First Amendment, 21 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 81, 81–83 (2006). 
 14 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97, 109 
(1991). 
 15 Andrew Gelman & Eric Loken, Ethics and Statistics: The AAA 
Tranche of Subprime Science, 27 CHANCE 51 (2014) (citing Andrew 
Gelman & Eric Loken, The Garden of Forking Paths: Why Multiple 
Comparisons Can Be a Problem Even When There Is No “Fishing 
Expedition” or “P-hacking” and the Research Hypothesis Was Posited 
Ahead of Time (Nov. 14, 2013) (unpublished article, Columbia University), 
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/p_hacking.pdf. 
 16 KING ET AL., supra note 7, at 104 n.14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/18
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Another cure for this problem is the pre-registration movement,17 in 
which scholars publically list exactly what they intend to examine, 
including the number of subjects they plan to test.   
A final explanation for the inability to replicate findings is, sadly, 
that some published research is just fraudulent. As virtually every 
political scientist knows, Science recently withdrew an article by 
LaCour and Green on support for same-sex marriage at the request of 
Professor Green and under suspicion of fraud by LaCour. Other 
prominent examples of alleged fraud include Burt’s studies on the 
heritability of IQ;18 John Lott’s studies of the effectiveness of 
brandishing a weapon when approached by an attempted mugger;19 
and Bellesiles’s study of the extent of gun ownership in colonial and 
early national periods of American history.20 
Beyond the replication crisis afflicting behavioral sciences, the 
relationship between attitudes and behavior is fairly weak. Wicker’s 
survey of the literature, found the typical correlation between 
attitudes and behavior to be about 0.3.21 More recent analyses have 
 
 17 What is Preregistration, Anyway?, ASS’N PSYCHOL. SCI., 
https://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/observer/obsonline/what
-is-preregistration-anyway.html#.WQnlUtLysdU 
 18 Cyril Burt, The Inheritance of Mental Ability, 13 AM. PSYCHOL. 1 
(1958). They Cyril Burt Affair, HUM. INTELLIGENCE, 
http://www.intelltheory.com/burtaffair.shtml (discussing the allegations of 
fraud). 
 19 JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME 5 (1998). The GOP’s 
Favorite Gun “Academic” Is A Fraud, THINK PROGRESS, 
https://thinkprogress.org/debunking-john-lott-5456e83cf326 (discussing the 
allegations of fraud). 
 20 MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A 
NATIONAL GUN CULTURE 70 (2000). One New York Times article notes 
Emory University’s finding that Bellisiles was guilty of “unprofessional and 
misleading work.” Patricia Cohen, Scholar Emerges from Doghouse, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/books/04bellisles.html. 
 21 Allan W. Wicker, Attitudes Versus Actions: The Relationship of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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confirmed these results,22 with Armitage and Christian noting, 
“historically, attitudes had been assumed to be predictive of behavior, 
although this assumption was often held in the face of compelling 
evidence to the contrary.”23 
My counter-example to both the notion that much behavioral 
science cannot be replicated, as well as the generally weak 
relationship between attitudes and behavior, is the relationship 
between the ideology of Supreme Court Justices and their votes on 
the Court, otherwise known as “the attitudinal model.”24 
Efforts at measuring judicial preferences have focused on two 
types of measures: endogenous measures, those derived in whole or 
in part from the votes justices cast; and exogenous measures, those 
completely independent of the votes the Justices cast.25 Depending on 
one’s purpose, both have their time and place. 
Perhaps the earliest use of exogenous measures of to predict 
Justices’ votes was Nagel, who used political party as his predictor.26  
Nagel conducted a study of “313 state and federal supreme court 
judges.”27  He gathered their decisions from non-unanimous state and 
federal supreme courts cases and their political party identification 
 
Verbal and Overt Behavioral Responses to Attitude Objects, 25 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 41 (1969).  
 22 Icek Ajzen, Nature and Operation of Attitudes, 52 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 27, 39 (2001); ICEK AJZEN & MARTIN FISHBEIN, THE HANDBOOK 
OF ATTITUDES 173, 182 (D. Albarracin, B.T. Johnson, and M.P. Zanna eds.); 
Christopher J. Armitage & Julie Christian, From Attitudes to Behaviour: 
Basic and Applied Research on the Theory of Planned Behaviour, 22 
CURRENT PSYCHOL. 187 (2003). 
 23  Armitage & Christian, supra note 22, at 187. 
 24 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
 25  Jeffrey Segal, Measuring Political Preferences. 17 J. L. & CTS. 1, 4–
5 (2007).  
 26 Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843, 843–50 (1961). 
 27 Id. at 843. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/18
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from either the Directory of American Judges, Who’s Who in 
America or from a survey that he sent the judges. Not surprisingly, 
Democratic judges voted significantly more liberally than Republican 
judges in twelve of his fifteen issue areas.28 
Nagel’s survey also asked the judges to provide their agreement or 
disagreement with a large set of policy issues. He received 118 usable 
responses. 29 The survey included statements such as “colored people 
are innately inferior to white people,” (37% of the judges agreed) 
“[t]he Jews have too much power and influence in this country” (9% 
agreed), or “our treatment of criminals is too harsh; we should try to 
cure, not to punish them” (20% agreed).30  Nagel then associated 
those attitudinal measures with the decisional data from his 1961 
study. He found that those with more liberal attitudinal scores were 
more likely to vote liberally.31 While this was a highly valuable 
study, it is ever-more doubtful that state supreme court judges would 
continue to respond to such surveys, especially in the increasingly 
polarized political environment in which courts exist. It is also a fact 
that Nagel never states how many, if any, of the 313 responses came 
from Supreme Court Justices.32 
 Danelski’s study of Justices Pierce Butler and Louis Brandeis 
coded speeches by Butler and Brandeis prior to their nomination to 
the Supreme Court with special concerns for their views on laissez-
faire economics.33 Though pioneering, Danelski’s methodology was 
unlikely to be usable by other scholars as Supreme Court nominees 
often do not have voluminous written records, and like Justice David 
Souter, may be chosen precisely for that reason.34  In pursuit of a 
 
 28 Id. at 845. 
 29 STUART NAGEL, OFF-THE-BENCH JUDICIAL ATTITUDES in JUDICIAL 
DECISION-MAKING 29 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963). 
 30 Id. at 32. 
 31 Id.at 40. 
 32 Id. 
 33 David J. Danelski, Values as Variables in Judicial Decision-Making: 
Notes Toward a Theory, 19 VAND. L. REV. 721 (1966). 
 34 DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES (1999). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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valid and reliable exogenous measure of judicial ideology that exists 
for all modern nominees, Segal and Cover chose newspaper editorials 
from four of the nation’s leading newspapers, the New York Times, 
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune, the first 
two being left-of-center, while the last two leaned to the right.35  As 
the L.A. Times moved left over time, Segal added the Wall Street 
Journal to the list. 
In 1989, Segal and Cover correlated the Segal-Cover scores with 
civil liberties data from Harold Spaeth’s Supreme Court database 
covering the years 1953 through 1988.36  Though the n was only 
eighteen Justices (Earl Warren to Anthony Kennedy), the correlation 
was 0.80, which is remarkably high for an attitude-behavior 
relationship.37 Needless to say with so small an n it would be 
necessary to show that this relationship, strong as it was, did not just 
capitalize on chance.    
Segal and Spaeth added the 1989 term and the correlation 
coefficient in civil liberties votes dropped from 0.80 to 0.79 in Civil 
liberties votes from, again Warren to Kennedy.38   
Segal et al. backdated the Segal-Cover scores to Hugo Black, 
while Spaeth backdated the Supreme Court database to pre-1946.39  
With thirty-one Justices from Black to Thomas and Supreme Court 
civil liberties decisions from 1946 through 1992, the correlation 
coefficient dropped to 0.69.40  
In 1996, Epstein and Mershon conducted an “audit” of the Segal-
Cover scores noting: “it would hardly be an exaggeration to write that 
almost every recent study of Court decision making has—in one way 
 
 35 Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the 
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559 
(1989). 
 36 Id. at 560–61. 
 37 Id. at 561. 
 38 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, supra note 24, at 228. 
 39 Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices Revisited. 57 J. OF POL. 812, 813 (1995). 
 40 Id. at 817. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/18
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or another—invoked these scores.”41 They found “The Segal/Cover 
scores work quite well—at least for civil liberties cases—during one 
Court era (1969-1985), perform poorly for another (1953-1986), and 
produce mixed results for yet a third (1986-1991).”42 
Segal and Spaeth returned to Civil liberties votes, this time from 
Warren through Ginsburg (n = 35) covering the 1953 through 1999 
Terms, finding R = 0.76.43  In a forum on Segal and Spaeth in the 
2003 Law and Courts Newsletter, Howard Gillman wrote that the 
book “is a distinctive combination of rigorous data (carefully selected 
to focus on the cases that work best for the model).44  Gillman 
explains: 
in this long book, the core evidence in favor of the attitudinal 
model with respect to decisions on the merits is outlined in just 
two little paragraphs on pp.322-323, and summarized in Table 
8.2. Spaeth and Segal compare the (unfortunately imprecise 
but apparently close enough) Segal-Cover scores (measuring 
judicial ideology) to… all formally decided civil liberties 
cases” decided from 1953 through 1999. In case you are 
interested the correlation is 0.76 with an r2 = 0.57. Believe it or 
not, that is the sum and substance of the book’s proof for the 
model, as applied to final decisions on the merits, where the 
model is said to work best. 
Gillman then goes on to declare 
even on its own terms, the model is not a general explanation 
for all Supreme Court decision making; at best it is a partial 
explanation for a subset of votes in cases that raise the most 
ideologically divisive issues of law. Other political scientists 
 
 41 Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 
AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 261, 265 (1996). 
 42 Id. at 284. 
 43 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 23 (2002). 
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who refer to the model would be well advised to incorporate 
this moderating point in their own work, so as not to leave a 
misleading impression about the state of the evidence. In fact, 
it would be a service to the discipline if Segal and Spaeth 
would provide statistics on the correlation between Segal-
Cover scores and a random sample of all Supreme Court 
decisions over the past half century. That would put all of us in 
a much better position to get a balanced perspective on the role 
of conventional political ideology on the justices’ behavior.45 
In response to Gillman’s challenge, Segal and Spaeth quickly 
examined the relationship between the ideology of the Justices and 
the ideological direction of their votes in all Supreme Court cases 
(with the minor exception of interstate boundary disputes, which have 
no conceivable ideological content).46 Indeed, in the same newsletter 
that Gillman made his allegations Segal and Spaeth reported as 
follows: “In the book we reported a correlation between ideology and 
civil liberties votes of .76, rounding up from .758. We now report that 
when we look at all cases, the correlation coefficient does indeed 
drop, all the way to .757—a whole one-thousandth of a point!”47 
While most relationships dissipate over time, the relationship 
between ideology and voting behavior has only strengthened over 
time. Backdating the data to 1946 and starting with Vinson lowers the 
Segal-Cover correlation from 0.80 to 0.69.48  On the other hand, if we 
only examine the relationship between ideology and votes for the 
eight Justices who served prior to the 2016 Term of the Roberts 
Court, we find a correlation of 0.94. Needless to say, none of the 
current Justices were part of the original Segal-Cover dataset.   
 
 45 Symposium, ‘The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 
Revisited’—Authors Meet Critics, 13 L. & CT. 12, 14 (2003). 
 46 Id. at 31. 
 47 Id. at 33. 
 48 Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices Revisited. 57 J. POL. 812, 817 (1995). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/18
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For the current Justices on the Roberts Court (excepting Justice 
Gorsuch), Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Ginsburg, and Alito vote 
almost precisely as predicted from their Segal-Cover scores. Justices 
Breyer and Roberts are a bit more liberal, while Justice Kennedy, 
who was viewed very moderately following the failed nominations of 
conservatives Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg, surprisingly comes 
out more conservative than predicted, as does Justice Thomas, though 
that is not surprising.  
 Simply put, this is a remarkable relationship, all the more so 
given the weak relationship that psychologists have found over 
several decades exploring the attitude-behavior relationship, as well 
as the “reproducibility crisis.”  
Allow me to speculate on some reasons for the increase. One is 
that the Supreme Court is more ideologically driven than it used to 
be.49 This suggests that there was once a principled age of Supreme 
 
 49 ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 2 (1990) (chapter 3).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Court decision making, though Bork himself does not discuss when 
that might have been. McCloskey’s volume finds politics rampant 
throughout the Court’s history.50 Empirically, Spaeth and Segal find 
no evidence that “precedential” behavior by the Justices has 
decreased over time.51  
Alternatively, it might be the case that the increase in this 
relationship is due to the greater importance of the Supreme Court in 
national affairs. A Court that once spent much of its time on 
economic questions has, since 1954, taken on segregation,52 
reapportionment,53 criminal procedure,54 sex discrimination,55 
abortion,56 and same-sex marriage.57 This has manifested itself in 
various ways. First, we no longer observe Presidents appointing 
Justices substantially out of line with the Presidents’ preferences, as 
we do with Eisenhower’s appointments of Warren and Brennan. 
Conservatives cry “No more Souters!” and they are probably correct 
in that we will not likely see another unknown moderate who is 
vouched for as a conservative.58 Second, interest groups now 
participate at much higher levels than they once did, providing 
editorial writers with much greater information than they once had.59 
Third, there has been a great increase in the number of editorials per 
 
 50 ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960). 
 51  HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR 
MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
287 (1999). 
 52 Brown v. Bd. Educ., 347 U.S. 484 (1954). 
 53 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 54 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 55 Reed. v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 56 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
 57 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 58 LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 62 (2005).  
 59 LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 703 (6th 
ed., 2016). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/18
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nominee.60 From the nomination of Hugo Black (1937) through 
Thurgood Marshall (1967), no Justice had more than two editorials 
per newspaper.  Between Burger (1969) and Thomas (1991), eight of 
the eleven nominees received at least three editorials per newspaper.61 
The confirmation of Justice Gorsuch should continue the 
economic conservatism and the social liberalism of the Roberts 
Court. However, replacement of either Justice Kennedy or Justice 
Ginsburg will pull the Roberts Court strongly to the right on social 
issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and same-sex marriage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60 Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 814 (1995). 
 61 Id. 
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